Sokolsky v. Kuhn, 405 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1981) by Siegel, Mark R.
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 10 | Issue 2 Article 7
Spring 1982
Sokolsky v. Kuhn, 405 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1981)
Mark R. Siegel
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mark R. Siegel, Sokolsky v. Kuhn, 405 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1981), 10 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 301 (2017) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol10/iss2/7
Creditors' Rights-GARNISHMENT-REDUCING PAST-DUE CHILD
SUPPORT TO FINAL MONEY JUDGMENT: THE VANISHING EXCEPTION TO
WAGE EXEMPTION-Sokolsky v. Kuhn, 405 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1981).
The plaintiff, Audrey Kuhn, in Sokolsky v. Kuhn' established a
foreign divorce decree in a Florida court and reduced overdue child
support payments to a final money judgment. She subsequently
filed a motion for writ of garnishment of her former 'husband'swages, seeking to satisfy her final judgment. The trial court issued
the writ of garnishment and the garnishee responded as to the
amount it was indebted to Sokolsky, the former husband. Before
final judgment of garnishment was entered, Sokolsky moved to dis-
solve the garnishment. He filed an affidavit alleging that he was
entitled to an exemption as the head of a family residing in Florida
and that the garnished funds were exempt wages.' Kuhn failed to
file a controverting affidavit as mandated by section 222.12 of the
Florida Statutes in order to contest the wage exemption claim
made under section 222.11. The trial court granted final judgment
against the garnishee and concluded that Sokolsky was not exempt
from garnishment under Florida Statutes, section 61.12, the ali-
mony and child support exception to the wage exemption.' Al-
l. 405 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1981).
2. As head of family, Sokolsky claimed that his wages were exempt from garnishment
pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 222.11 (1979). Section 222.11 provides:
No writ of attachment or garnishment or other process shall issue from any of the
courts of this state to attach or delay the payment of any money or other thing
due to any person who is the head of a family residing in this state, when the
money or other thing is due for the personal labor or services of such person.
Section 222.11 was amended in 1981 to provide that "[als used in this section, the term
'head of family' includes any unmarried, divorced, legally separated, or widowed person who
is providing more than one-half of the support for a child or other dependent." FLA. STAT. §
222.11 (1981). FLA. STAT. § 222.12 (1979) sets forth the procedure to establish the
exemption:
Whenever any money or other thing due for labor or services as aforesaid is at-
tached by such process, the person to whom the same is due and owing may make
oath before the officer who issued the process that the money attached is due for
the personal labor and services of such person, and he is the head of a family
residing in said state. When such an affidavit is made, notice of same shall be
forthwith given to the party, or his attorney, who sued out the process, and if the
facts set forth in such affidavit are not denied under oath within 2 days after the
service of said notice, the process shall be returned, and all proceedings under the
same shall cease. If the facts stated in the affidavit are denied by the party who
sued out the process within the time above set forth and under oath, then the
matter shall be tried by the court from which the writ or process issued, in like
manner as claims to property levied upon by writ of execution are tried, and the
money or thing attached shall remain subject to the process until released by the
judgment of the court which shall try the issue.
3. FLA. STAT. § 61.12 (1979). Section 61.12, which creates an exception to the exemption
for the head of a family, provides in relevant part:
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though the district court affirmed, Sokolsky argued in a petition
for rehearing that section 61.12 was inapplicable because Kuhn
had reduced the child support "order" to a final "judgment" for
arrearages.' The district court rejected this argument finding that,
although the support arrearages had been reduced to a money
judgment, the garnishment "proceeding remained essentially one
for child support."' 5 Since section 61.12 applied, Kuhn's failure to
file a controverting affidavit had no effect on the proceedings. 6 The
Florida Supreme Court granted review, posing the determinative
issue as "whether section 61.12(1), Florida Statutes (1979), permit-
ting garnishment of wages of the head of household 'to enforce the
orders of t he court of this state for alimony, suit money, or child
support,' applies where child support arrearages had been reduced
to a final money judgment."7
Justice Alderman opined that the final money judgment entered
in favor of the former wife was not an order within the purview of
section 61.12: "When a money judgment is entered providing for
execution, the provisions of section 61.12 are not applicable."
Therefore, the court held that the section 61.12 exception to the
head of family exemption from garnishment of a former spouse's
wages did not apply when the former wife obtained a final judg-
ment for past-due child support.' The supreme court supported its
opinion with a literal reading of section 61.12 in deciding to quash
(1) So much as the court orders of the money or other things due to any per-
son or public officer, state or county, whether the head of family residing in this
state or not, when the money or other thing is due for the personal labor or service
of the person or otherwise, is subject to attachment or garnishment to enforce the
orders of the court of this state for alimony, suit money, or child support, or other
orders in proceedings for dissolution, alimony, or child support ....
It should be noted that § 61.12 has the following effect: (1) It allows attachment or gar-
nishment of wages due the head of a family, (2) it allows the state to be subject to attach-
ment or garnishment, and (3) it provides that a court may issue a continuing writ of gar-
nishment to enforce payment of child support or alimony.
Sections 61.12 and 222.11 are gender neutral and recognize the situation in which the
husband seeks to garnish his former wife's wages to satisfy her child support and alimony
obligations. While the ex-husband can be awarded child support and alimony, it is still more
common for the ex-husband to pay his ex-wife. Therefore, for purposes of clarity and consis-
tency with the factual circumstances of the cases, this note will assume that the ex-wife
seeks to garnish her ex-husband's wages.
4. Sokolsky v. Kuhn, 386 So. 2d 806, 808 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (on denial of the
petition for rehearing).
5. Id. at 807.
6. 405 So. 2d at 976.
7. Id. at 975.
8. Id. at 977.
9. Id.
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the decision of the district court. 10
I. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND THE UNDERLYING CLAIM
In reaching its holding, the court signaled a retreat from what
had been the majority rule among the district courts of appeal. 1
Absent from the Sokolsky opinion was an analysis concerning the
purposes and policies behind sections 222.11 and 61.12. Because
section 61.12 gives the former wife the ability to garnish or attach
the wages of the former husband, it should be recognized as a re-
medial statute entitled to a liberal construction advancing and ef-
fectuating the legislative intent. 2 Section 61.001 provides that
"[t]his chapter shall be liberally construed and applied to promote
its purposes."' 3 One such express purpose is "[tlo mitigate the po-
tential harm to the spouses and their children caused by the pro-
cess of legal dissolution of marriage. '
To read chapter 61 in isolation, however, would be incorrect and
would not help resolve the competing policies of section 61.12 and
section 222.11. Florida case law recognizes that the purpose behind
the exemption laws in chapter 222 is to prevent the unfortunate
citizen and his family from becoming public charges.' 5 Such wage
exemption statutes enable the debtor to continue to support his
family,'" thereby relieving the family from the expense and hard-
ship which would inevitably result when wages were garnished. 7
Since public policy in Florida requires that judicial determinations
providing for child support payments be enforceable, 8 and because
the courts have deemed the underlying purposes of section 222.11
10. The court noted that had the former wife not obtained a final judgment of arrearages
subject to execution, the district court would have been entirely correct in holding § 61.12
creates an exception to the § 222.11 exemption. Id.
11. Id. The court overruled the following cases to the extent that they were inconsistent
with Sokolsky: Busot v. Busot, 354 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Clemons v.
Morris, 350 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Hall v. Air Force Fin. Center, 344 So.
2d 1340 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977); and DeCastro v. DeCastro, 334 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
12. In Hall v. Air Force Fin. Center, 344 So. 2d at 1344, the district court engaged in
such an analysis and liberally construed § 61.12 to cover final judgments.
13. FLA. STAT. § 61.001(1) (1979).
14. Id. § 61.001(2)(c).
15. Patten Package Co. v. Houser, 136 So. 353, 355 (Fla. 1931).
16. Wolf v. Commander, 188 So. 83, 84 (Fla. 1939).
17. Noland Co. v. Linning, 132 So. 2d 802, 804 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
18. City of Jacksonville v. Jones, 213 So. 2d 259, 259-60 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
The district court articulated this purpose in finding that § 61.12 permitted garnishment of
a municipality.
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to apply to the family, sections 222.11 and 61.12 can be read in
pari materia. By recognizing that the exemption statutes protect
the dependents of the wage earner, the courts should not use sec-
tion 222.11 as a device to relieve the former husband of his obliga-
tion to support his former wife and children.19
The Sokolsky court, in contravention of the mandates of section
61.001, reached its holding through a formalistic and restrictive
reading of section 61.12, concluding that a final money "judgment"
was not the equivalent of an "order" of the court for child sup-
port.20 By elevating form over substance, the court sidestepped the
basic purposes underlying sections 61.12 and 222.11 to achieve a
result the legislature never intended. The court's holding was even
more curious because of its recognition that there are differing pol-
icy concerns when a third-party creditor in a normal debtor-credi-
tor relationship seeks garnishment as compared to an ex-wife seek-
ing to enforce past-due child support payments.2 1 Even if the
former husband remarries, section 61.12 contemplates that it is
within the discretion of the court to garnish "[s]o much [of his
wages] as the court orders. ' 22 Therefore, within the constructs of
section 61.12, the court has the express power to prevent the ex-
husband's new family from becoming a public charge while at the
same time enforcing his legal obligation for child support to his
prior family.2 3 Yet the Sokolsky court soundly quashed the latter
policy choice by denying the ex-wife a remedy under section 61.12
when her court-ordered child support payment arrearages were re-
duced to final judgment.
While it is possible to resolve the issue in Sokolsky based upon
an examination of the underlying purposes of sections 222.11 and
19. This point was precisely addressed in Meadows v. Meadows, 619 P.2d 598, 600 (Okla.
1980).
20. 405 So. 2d at 977.
21. Id. at 977 n.1. Certainly, § 222.11 was designed to protect against predatory creditors
and not the former spouse who has reduced child support arrearages to a final judgment.
The Sokolsky court recognized this precise point in commenting upon Killian v. Lawson,
387 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 1980), in which the wage exemption was used to defeat a claim made by
a third-party creditor. The court was careful to note that the use of the wage exemption in
Killian was not available to the ex-husband to defeat his former wife's garnishment for
past-due child support since "such an absurd result" was not intended. 405 So. 2d at 977
n.1.
22. FLA. STAT. § 61.12(1) (1979).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (Supp. IV 1981) provides a maximum percentage of disposable
earnings that can be subjected to garnishment to enforce child support orders. These maxi-
mum percentages preempt state law and limit the permissible garnishment. Phillips v. Gen-
eral Fin. Corp. of Fla., 297 So. 2d 6, 8 (Fla. 1974). See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
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61.12, one court has adopted a rationale based upon the origin of
the claim to garnishment. In concluding that section 61.12 was ap-
plicable when the support arrearages were reduced to final judg-
ment, the First District Court of Appeal stated that the "proceed-
ing remained essentially one for child support. 2 4 Inherent in the
district court's analysis is the recognition that the genesis of the
former wife's claim to garnishment lies in a court order for child
support. Through the valid court order, the former wife obtained a
final judgment for arrearages. The supreme court was remiss in
failing to consider the origin of the claim to garnishment. Had the
supreme court adopted an analysis that contemplated the genesis
of the wife's claim regardless of the final money judgment, the pur-
poses behind section 61.12 would have been promoted and she
could have enforced the court-ordered child support by
garnishment.
Based upon the essential concept that a final judgment is not a
"court order," the Sokolsky court concluded that section 61.12 is
inapplicable 2 5 The court, however, provided no further guidance to
distinguish between an order and a judgment. While an order for
child support is not in all respects the same as a final judgment,2 6
the Florida Supreme Court, in Vinson v. Vinson,27 found the dif-
ference to be that an order was enforced by contempt whereas a
judgment was enforced by execution.2 8 With the difference be-
tween an order and a judgment being the enforcement mechanism,
section 61.12, by subjecting wages to garnishment and attachment,
enables an order to be enforced through execution as if it were a
final judgment. In determining whether a judgment comes within
the purview of section 61.12, one commentator was critical of a de-
cision holding section 61.12 inapplicable and stated that "the court
was indulging in semantic hocus-pocus in distinguishing an 'order'
from a 'judgment.' ,,21 Whatever differences exist between orders
24. 386 So. 2d at 807. The First, Second, Third, and Fourth District Courts of Appeal
had all concluded § 61.12 applied where a final judgment had been obtained. See cases cited
supra notes 4, 10.
25. 405 So. 2d at 977.
26. See generally 26 FLA. JUR. 2D Family Law § 754 (1981).
27. 190 So. 454 (Fla. 1939).
28. Id. at 456-57. The Vinson court compared a "decree" with a judgment since at that
time there were separate courts of law and equity. The word "decrees" was stricken from §
61.12 when the courts of law and equity merged into one. Hall v. Air Force Fin. Center, 344
So. 2d at 1343-44.
29. Murray, Family Law, 24 U. MIAMI L. REV. 296, 306 (1970). The author was com-
menting on Noyes v. Cooper, 216 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1968). The author,
however, did state that if the final judgment for "past-due sums" were in the nature of
19821
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and judgments, prior to Sokolsky many appellate courts over-
looked such distinctions in order to serve the overriding policies of
section 61.12.30 These decisions affirmed the state policy favoring
the collection of alimony and child support.3"
II. FEDERAL GARNISHMENT LEGISLATION
While Sokolsky was decided strictly upon the basis of the Flor-
ida Statutes, the federal government has also enacted legislation
concerning wage garnishment for child support and alimony.2 In
enacting 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a), Congress limited wage garnishment
to twenty-five percent of the debtor's disposable earnings. The
twenty-five percent general rule, however, is subject to an excep-
tion for support orders of any person. The exception provides that
if the ex-husband is supporting his second family, the maximum
percentage is fifty percent while the maximum is sixty percent if
he is not supporting a second family."
The percentage formula represents a balancing of interests be-
tween the first and second families of the divorced spouse having
support obligations to both families. Section 1673(b)(2) specifically
contemplates that if an arrearage develops, " the maximum per-
centages increase by an additional five percent." Through 42
U.S.C. § 659(a) the government removed a shielding cloak of sover-
eign immunity and subjected itself to garnishment to enforce child
support and alimony obligations. Since section 659 is written in
general language to allow legal process to be brought for the en-
forcement of child support, Congress enacted section 662"' which
defines "child support" for the purposes of section 659. Under sec-
tion 662, a decree, order or judgment for child support can be en-
forced through section 659.23 While section 659 applies where the
property settlement and not meant to include alimony and child support, the decision may
have had some basis. Murray, supra, at 306.
30. See generally cases cited supra note 11.
31. See supra note 11.
32. Consumer Credit Protection Act § 303, 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) and
Social Security Act § 459, 42 U.S.C. § 659 (Supp. III 1979).
33. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1673(a), (b) (Supp. IV 1980).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1980) creates an arrearage when the payment is
more than 12 weeks overdue.
35. If the ex-husband is in arrears and supports a second family, the maximum percent-
age is 55%, but if there is not a second family, the maximum percentage is 65%. 15 U.S.C. §
1673(b)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1980).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 662 (Supp. III 1979).
37. The legislative history of § 659 recognized that legislation was needed which would
permit garnishment and attachment of federal wages where a support order or judgment
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spouse owing alimony or child support is a government employee,
the definitional section clarifies the scope of child support. Even
though section 1673 is the broader federal garnishment statute,
Congress has not enacted a similar definitional section. The case
law under section 1673, however, has achieved the same result by
holding that a judgment for arrearages is within the purview of the
statute.
In Evans v. Evans,38 the former wife had obtained a judgment
for past-due child support and brought garnishment proceedings
pursuant to section 659. The court found that even though the ar-
rearages had been reduced to final judgment, wage garnishment
was still an available remedy. The court concluded, however, that
the more restrictive state law governing garnishment applied 9 and
found that no more than twenty-five percent of the ex-husband's
retirement pay could be garnished. A similar result was reached in
Samples v. Samples.40 The wife had obtained a final judgment for
support arrearages and garnished the United States since her ex-
husband was a former employee of the government. The district
court found that "[tihis garnishment is permitted by 42 U.S.C. §
659."41 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Murray v. Mur-
ray 42 relied upon the child support definition contained in section
662 to conclude that garnishment proceedings pursuant to section
659 applied where the former wife had obtained a judgment for
attorney fees awarded in connection with her judgment for ali-
mony and child support.43
Where support arrearages have been reduced to final judgment,
Florida is not without case law. In Williams v. Williams,44 the for-
mer wife successfully subjected her former husband's retirement
benefits to garnishment under section 659 in satisfaction of a Flor-
ida judgment for arrearages.' 5
existed. 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 8133, 8157 (emphasis added).
38. 429 F. Supp. 580 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
39. Id. at 582. The federal court found that the garnishment may not exceed 25% of
disposable earnings pursuant to the applicable Oklahoma limitation. Id. It should be noted
that Evans was decided prior to the maximum percentage established under § 1673(b)(2) for
child support.
40. 414 F. Supp. 773 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
41. Id.
42. 558 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1977).
43. Id. at 1340-42.
44. 338 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
45. Id. at 870. The arrearages in Williams were for alimony but § 659 applies equally to
child support arrearages. See supra text accompanying note 36. The district court in Wil-
liams found that the monies owed to Mrs. Williams under a Texas divorce decree were
1982]
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Section 61.12 of the Florida Statutes and 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b)(2)
are similar because in permitting wage garnishment for the en-
forcement of support orders neither statute includes the word
"judgment." Yet courts have held that a judgment for child sup-
port arrearages is within the purview of section 1673(b). In Pell-
erin v. Pellerin,4 e the Supreme Court of Arkansas held that a judg-
ment based upon a court order for child support arrearages came
within the scope of section 1673(b).4 7 The court found the legisla-
tive history of section 1673 decisive because it provided that "[t]he
restriction on garnishment provided for in the bill does not apply
to any debt due to a court order for the support of any person
(domestic relations cases) or for State or Federal taxes. 4 8
The Pellerin decision was followed in Brown v. Tubbs49 and
cited with approval in V_ v. S_ 50 The V_ v. S__ court, in
determining whether child support arrearages reduced to final
judgment came within the scope of section 1673(b)(2), stated that
"[u]nquestionably, an order for child support does not change its
essential character simply because it remains unsatisfied.""1 Based
upon the former wife's pleadings, however, the court distinguished
between the final judgment sub judice and a final judgment for
support arrearage.52 Therefore, the court concluded that because
the judgment supporting the garnishment action was not an "order
tantamount to alimony notwithstanding the fact that "alimony" was against public policy in
Texas. Id.
46. 534 S.W.2d 767 (Ark. 1976).
47. Id. at 768.
48. Id. (quoting 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1978). Since Pellerin was decided
prior to the enactment of § 1673(b)(2), the issue was whether the 25% maximum estab-
lished by § 1673(a) applied or whether the exception of § 1673(b)(1) applied. The enactment
of § 1673(b)(2) would not alter the court's analysis but would only limit the maximum per-
centage subject to garnishment.
49. 582 P.2d 1165 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978). The Kansas appellate court noted that under its
state law, similar to the Arkansas law applicable in Pellerin, garnishment was not available
on a support order that was not reduced to judgment. Id. at 1168. But cf. Butler v. Butler,
277 S.E.2d 180, 184 (Va. 1981). The Butler court distinguished Pellerin based upon the
nature of the underlying support order. Under Virginia law, support orders were judgments
for purposes of enforcement by garnishment; the arrearage judgment in Butler, however,
was based upon a contractual property settlement, and not upon court ordered support.
50. 579 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
51. Id. at 151.
52. Id. The court determined that the mother was entitled to reimbursement for past
expenditures "upon the basis of her quasi-contractual relationship with the child's father."
Id. at 152. Since the suit was for reimbursement to the mother and not for the support of
the child, the garnishment action did not fall within the larger wage garnishment percent-
ages provided by 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
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of any court for the support of any person,"53 the former wife was
subject to the restrictions under section 1673(a)(1) and could not
garnish in excess of twenty-five percent of disposable earnings.
4
Importantly, the court did not reach its result based upon a dis-
tinction between an order and judgment.
III. THE EFFECT OF Sokolsky
In the aftermath of Sokolsky, an ex-wife suing for child support
arrearages is in a precarious position. As Sokolsky teaches, once an
order for child support is reduced to a final judgment for arrear-
ages, section 61.12, Florida Statutes, is no longer applicable.55
Therefore, the ex-wife assisted by legal counsel will need to engage
in a financial analysis of the delinquent former husband. If her ex-
husband is wealthy, or at least has assets worth more than the ar-
rearage amount, she may proceed to reduce the arrearages to final
judgment. Having obtained a judgment, she may then direct the
sheriff to execute against such assets." For the ex-wife faced with
the foregoing scenario, Sokolsky may not appear too harsh. Where
the ex-husband has marginal assets, however, the ex-wife will need
to monitor closely the rising arrearages against the limited assets.5 7
A likely scenario may be that the wife's former husband has no
assets other than wages. Under these facts, after Sokolsky, the ex-
wife would certainly not opt to reduce child support arrearages to
final judgment because the only hope for payment is to look to-
ward these wages. The latter situation appears to be the precise
example to which section 61.12 would be applicable.
In light of Sokolsky, the remaining question for the wife who has
obtained a final judgment for arrearages becomes the available
methods of enforcing court-ordered child support against the for-
mer husband's wages. It may be possible to draft pleadings to com-
port with section 61.12 by requesting an "order for arrearages of
child support" rather than a final judgment for arrearages.5 a The
more common method in Florida is to proceed under section
53. 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b)(1) (1979).
54. 579 S.W.2d at 152.
55. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
56. Presumably this is what the court had in mind when it stated that the ex-wife was
"governed by the general law relating to garnishment after judgment." 405 So. 2d at 977.
57. The analysis is overly simplistic in that it overlooks the added expenses of attorney's
fees, execution fees, amount to be realized at a sheriff's sale, and other liens against a partic-
ular asset.
58. See, e.g., Sheridan v. Sheridan, 334 So. 2d 172, 173 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
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61.13(1)1" once a judgment for support arrearages has already been
obtained. 0 The ex-wife could also proceed under section 61.1761 to
enforce or modify the child support obligation whether in the form
of an order or judgment.2 Additionally, contempt is an available
remedy to enforce the payment of a money judgment for support
arrearages6 The inherent flaw in any of these remedies lies in the
fact that the judgment for arrearages will not be satisfied by the
payment of a lump sum."4 These remedies modify the original or-
der and provide that a portion of the periodic payments will go
towards satisfying the arrearage while the remainder goes towards
satisfying the continuing support obligation. One other possibility
left unresolved by the Sokolsky court was whether the ex-wife
could seek to dissolve her final judgment in an effort to proceed
with her court-ordered child support under section 61.12.
IV. CONCLUSION
As a result of the recent Sokolsky opinion, the supreme court
has held section 61.12 inapplicable where an ex-wife reduced child
support arrearages to a money judgment. Notwithstanding the leg-
islative mandate to construe section 61.12 broadly to achieve its
remedial purpose, the court reversed a judicial policy favoring the
enforcement of support obligations and relegated the former wife
to the usual laws governing garnishment after judgment. Until the
Florida legislature amends section 61.12 to cover judgments based
59. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(1) (1981). Section 61.13(1) provides that the court originally en-
tering the child support order has continuing jurisdiction to modify the amount or terms of
the initial order.
60. Holmes v. Holmes, 384 So. 2d 1295 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Fagan v. Fagan, 381
So. 2d 278 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980). Interestingly, the Fagan court construed the judg-
ment to constitute an order of support. 381 So. 2d at 280. Since neither § 61.12 nor § 61.13
use the word "judgment," Fagan provides additional support for construing § 61.12 to cover
judgments as well as orders.
61. FLA. STAT. § 61.17 (1981).
62. Porter v. Porter, 401 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Haley v. Edwards, 233
So. 2d 647 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
63. Grotnes v. Grotnes, 338 So. 2d 1122, 1127 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
64. Even under § 61.12, if the amount of arrearages were great enough, the past-due
amounts would not be satisfied with a lump sum payment. Within the framework of § 61.12,
the arrearage amount should be satisfied in a shorter time-span since the court could allow
garnishment up to the maximum percentages allowed pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b)(2)(B)
(Supp. IV 1980). For a discussion of additional enforcement remedies available to the ex-
wife, see Walsh, Enforcement-Some Practical Suggestions for an Age-Old Problem, 52
FLA. B.J. 210 (1978).
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upon court-ordered child support, Sokolsky will bring about a re-
sult never intended by the legislature.
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